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“Lone Wolf” Terrorism and the Classical Jihad:
On the Contingencies of Violent Islamic Extremism 
Haider Ala Hamoudi*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is nearly impossible to describe Muslim expansionism in the 
centuries following the death of the Prophet Muhammad—broadly 
undertaken in service of the Islamic doctrine of jihad—as being somehow 
compatible with modern norms of international relations, including self-
determination and the noninterference in the affairs of other states.1 At first 
glance, this might seem to suggest a certain tension in modern Muslim 
thought that jihadist movements, and in particular the current bête noire of
the United States, the Islamic State,2 have been able to exploit. Modern 
Muslim intellectuals, that is, are forced to somehow reconcile an 
expansionist past, which was not only tolerated by classical jurists of the 
medieval era interpreting Islam’s sacred texts, but indeed exhorted by them 
as a duty of the Muslim community, with modern realities, where the jihad
as it was historically understood has become something of an 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Mohammad Fadel, Andrew March, Karima Bennoune, Beverly Moran, Rahimjon Abdugafurov 
and all of the participants and organizers at the October 23, 2015, Religion and the Law Symposium at 
the Florida International University College of Law for their generous comments, suggestions, and 
support. Any errors are the responsibility of the author. 
1 This is the subject of Part II of this paper. 
2 The Islamic State owes its origins to the Al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, led by Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi until his death. Will McCants, State of Confusion: ISIS’ Strategy and How to Counter It, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 10, 2014), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-09-10/state-confusion. A 
few years later, his successor and the Islamic State’s current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared 
himself Caliph and the organization began to call itself the Islamic State, claiming that it was the 
resumption of the historic Sunni Caliphate. Graeme Wood, What ISIS’s Leader Really Wants: The 
Longer He Lives, The More Powerful He Becomes, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 1, 2014), 
www.newrepublic.com/article/119259/isis-history-islamic-states-new-caliphate-syria-and-iraq. After the 
Islamic State managed to overrun the Iraqi city of Mosul and began to threaten the Kurdish city of Erbil, 
the United States initiated a series of air strikes against it. Isabel Coles, Iraqi Kurds Liberate Hundreds 
Trapped by ISIS on Sinjar Mountain, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2014), www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/18/
us-mideast-crisis-sinjar-idUSKBN0JW22G20141218. Shortly thereafter, the Islamic State reacted by 
killing American hostage James Foley, leading President Obama to denounce it in extremely strong 
terms. President Barack Obama, Statement on the Murder of James Foley (Aug. 20, 2014), 
www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/08/20/president-obama-delivers-statement-murder-
james-foley (follow “Read the Transcript” hyperlink) (describing the Islamic State as “terroriz[ing] their 
neighbors and offer[ing] them nothing, but an endless slavery to their empty vision, and the collapse of 
any definition of civilized behavior”). 
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embarrassment.3 In so doing, the argument runs, they leave themselves 
exposed to the “strict” and “literalist” claims of the defenders of the Islamic 
State,4 who can, and do, call up such classical juristic sources at will to 
demonstrate the true Islamicity of their actions5 relative to modernists, who 
can only rely on abstract principles, optimistic contextualizations, and 
vague apologies that sound suspiciously Western. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the fallacy of this conclusion. 
There is nothing “strict” or “literal” about modern jihadism, and in 
particular the jihadism of the Islamic State. The complex question of how 
Muslim polities are supposed to organize themselves in the context of a 
multipolar international system governed by norms of respect for territorial 
integrity that could scarcely have been imagined in the premodern era can 
hardly be approached in such a textualist fashion. 
Rather, jihadism must be seen as a modern Islamic response, one 
among many, to the modern circumstances in which Muslims find 
themselves. The point is not that the normative system developed by 
jihadist organizations is somehow an entirely implausible reading of the 
tradition, for it is not. Yet it is no more plausible, and no more “strict” or 
literal, than those (far more popular) readings that have found resources in 
the deep Islamic tradition from which to develop a conception of tolerance 
and mutual respect for non-Muslim polities. Reference to jihadism as 
“literal” application of shari’a—with the concomitant implication that the 
practices of modern Muslim nation states are somehow not “strict” or 
“literal” derivations of shari’a—confer a legitimacy on extremist 
movements that they hardly deserve. 
This short paper expounds on these themes through the examination of 
one of the most dangerous forms of terrorism in our times—that of “lone 
wolf” terrorism. The paper will show that while broadly accepted as a type 
of obligatory jihad by the world’s most extreme Islamist organizations, very 
much including the Islamic State, the practice suffers from its own tensions 
with the classical tradition. Thus, a modern Muslim intellectual seeking to 
3 One of the most salient attempts at such reconciliation appears in Sherman Jackson, Jihad and 
the Modern World, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1 (2002), discussed in Part IV of this paper. Jackson’s 
core argument is that the historical classical division of the world into two “houses”—one, the House of 
Islam, where the Muslims live, and the other, the House of War, that the Muslims sought to conquer—
was more a description of historical reality than a prescriptive Islamic demand to create such a world, or 
recreate it, as the case may be. Id. at 15–18. 
4 The repeated references to the most extreme manifestations of Islamism as being either “strict” 
or “literalist” is a problem I have also discussed in the context of family law. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The
Political Codification of Islamic Law: A Closer Look at the Draft Shi’i Personal Status Code of Iraq, 32
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 2, 4–5 (2015). 
5 Cole Bunzel & William McCants, Experts Weigh In (Part 1): How Does ISIS Approach 
Islamic Scripture?, BROOKINGS (March 24, 2015, 9:05 AM), www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/
2015/03/24-isis-approach-to-islamic-scripture-part-one-bunzel.
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normalize the modern international system on its own terms must contend 
with a tradition that assumes perduring hostility between a House of Islam 
and a House of War. However, an advocate of modern jihadism must 
similarly explain how the fundamentally conservative doctrine of classical 
jihad, designed to preserve the internal political order of the universal 
Muslim state and ensure its continuous expansion in a systematic and 
orderly fashion, could possibly justify the type of randomized and atomized 
form of individual violence that lone wolf terrorism represents. 
Explanations may be available, but they are likely to strike the modern 
Muslim more enamored of the current global order as artificial concoctions 
haphazardly patched together to justify on religious grounds violence that is 
fundamentally the product of psychopathy rather than religious argument. 
This is in fact not terribly dissimilar to accusations on the part of jihadists
to the Muslim mainstream that any sort of Islamic justification of the 
existing global order is some sort of capitulation to colonialist Western 
interests.
In the end, in other words, the issue does not center around which of 
the competing Islamic visions—one broadly compatible with international 
norms as reflected in the United Nations Charter and the other dedicated to 
the perpetration of violence of nearly any sort against non-Muslim polities 
and their inhabitants—is more “strict” or “literal.” It does not even center 
around which happens to be more plausible. The debate is almost entirely a 
normative and political one, concerning preferences for different 
worldviews. The classical doctrine is merely the mask beneath which this 
ideological contestation takes place. 
Following this Introduction, Part II of this paper offers a brief and 
necessarily reductive review of the classical doctrine of jihad. It will show 
that the earliest treatment of classical jihad presumes a Manichean universe, 
with the entire non-Muslim world reduced into a “House of War” that is fit 
to be conquered. At the same time, and less remarked upon, is the fact that 
the doctrine is also deeply and fundamentally conservative and meant very 
much to preserve an internal Islamic status quo within the other polity, the 
“House of Islam.” It is not that war is shunned, but rather that violence is 
initiated and organized in a systematic and thorough fashion under the 
leadership of the caliph. Part I also describes the manner in which classical 
thought evolved over time from this early vision in two different directions. 
First, the tradition began to include conceptions of defense, in particular 
following the Crusades in the West and the Mongol invasions in the East, as 
Muslim empires began to suffer significant setbacks after centuries of 
unbridled expansion. These conceptions involved violence directed at an 
enemy on a more localized scale, not necessarily approved, directed or 
managed by the caliph. Second, the recognition of non-Muslim polities on a 
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more permanent basis developed more salience as it became obvious that 
they were not likely to fall subject to Islamic rule within any reasonable 
period of time. 
Part III will show the manner in which Muslim states used the second 
of these trends in order to evolve in a manner that permitted them to 
participate broadly in the rise of an international order that is currently 
based not upon subjugation and conquest, but rather (at least in theory) 
upon territorial integrity and the right of self-determination.6 It will 
demonstrate specifically the Islamic justifications that underlie this 
significant shift in perspective, broadly adopted by the vast majority of the 
world’s Muslims. 
In Part IV, I turn to the jihadist critique of this approach as effectively 
an elaborate apologia to the infidel’s system of international governance. 
This Part lays out the manner in which jihadism has developed its own rules 
of orchestrated violence on a far more individualized scale, drawing on the 
first of the evolutionary trends described in Part II. Part IV also 
demonstrates, however, that even if the jihadists have managed to reassert 
the early classical Manicheism, they have done it in a manner that glorifies 
a form of individualized and self-directed violence—lone wolf terrorism—
that stands in stark tension with the classical tradition. For that tradition 
called for the expansion of the House of Islam in an organized and 
systematic fashion, not the killing of enemies wherever and however they 
could be found, irrespective of the manner and the cost.7 The point, as Part 
IV makes clear, is that there is no such thing as a “literal” application of 
classical jihad in the modern world. The doctrine developed in a place and 
time very different from our own, and as such any effort to apply it would 
involve some level of license to render it sensible and responsive to modern 
contingencies. As to whether that license should be deployed to harmonize 
Islamic law with the modern law of nations, or whether it should be used to 
reject and resist that order in the most violent manner imaginable is of 
6 After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the idea that global powers generally, and the United 
States in particular, respect territorial integrity or national self-determination in the manner demanded by 
international law has been subject to criticism and scrutiny. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the 
Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 180–236 (2004) (indicating that the invasion of Iraq 
proceeded on legal bases that were dubious at best). Indeed, the reason for the popularity of jihadism
may be due to such actions, which are perceived by many in the Muslim world as a form of colonialism 
that must be resisted. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the 
Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 463–67 (2008) (describing 
“resistance” to foreign aggression, occupation and colonialism as the raison d’etre of many Islamist 
movements). It is important to note that this criticism is orthogonal to the themes of this paper, which is 
attempting to contrast a classical theory of international relations with a modern one, in order to show 
that no modern international practice could in fact sensibly resurrect the classical theory because of its 
irrelevance to modern conditions. On the question of whether or not international practice in fact follows 
the modern norms and principles espoused in the U.N. Charter, this paper is entirely agnostic. 
7 See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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course an important question. However, it is at heart a political one more 
than a doctrinal one. As is often the case, the law merely supplies the 
rhetoric for the underlying political argument. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CLASSICAL JIHAD
A.  Early Conceptions 
It would be a severe categorical error to treat classical Islamic law as 
some sort of monolithic whole that admits no variation in approach. In fact, 
it is structurally pluralistic,8 an almost undiluted form of jurists’ law, to 
paraphrase one of the premier Islamic law scholars of the twentieth 
century.9 Classical Sunni Islamic law is an oft-conflicting and largely 
overlapping corpus of material developed by a variety of different jurists 
over the course of centuries working within four primary schools of 
thought, deriving their various rules from the broadly accepted foundational 
sources of Islamic law, which are the Qur’an, or the Revealed Book of God, 
and the Sunna, or the statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.10
In light of this structural pluralism, it would be impossible to describe 
in an absolutely precise fashion what classical Islamic law had to say about 
anything at all, very much including the highly charged subject of jihad.
Nevertheless, certain broad themes are identifiable from the works of the 
more influential jurists writing on the subject. These are described below. 
One of the most historically influential juristic compendia on the 
subject of international relations is authored by Muhammad ibn Hasan al-
Shaybani, an immediate disciple to one of the eponyms of one of the four 
Sunni schools, the renowned Abu Hanifa.11 Shaybani’s influence is so 
immense that he has been commonly referred to as the Hugo Grotius12 of 
Islamic law.13 While the claim is at the very least reductive,14 there is little 
doubt that his work deeply influenced, and continues to influence, 
generations of jurists long after him. I therefore begin with a brief review of 
Shaybani’s description of international relations generally before 
8 Hamoudi, supra note 6, at 434–35. 
9 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 5 (1982). 
10 Hamoudi, supra note 6, at 434–35. 
11 MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 29–30 (1966).
12 Hugo Grotius was a seventeenth century Dutch scholar and diplomat most commonly credited 
with founding modern international law. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 3 (2008). 
13 Philip C. Jessup, Foreword to MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS:
SHAYBANI’S SIYAR, at ix–x (1966).
14 See id. at x (quoting Khadduri to the effect that “to identify the names of Shaybani and 
Grotius . . . will not add laurels necessarily to a classical author whose place in the history of 
jurisprudence is assured.”).  
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proceeding to describe the subsequent evolution of thought during the 
classical era, and after it ended. 
By way of introduction, early classical jurists, very much including 
Shaybani, envisioned the world as largely divided in a rather Manichean 
fashion between a single, unified Muslim polity on the one hand, the House 
of Islam, and the entire mass of humanity on the other, located in the House 
of War.15 The ultimate aim of the House of Islam was to bring the entire 
world within the House of Islam.16 War, or the jihad, is no more and no less 
a means to this end in Shaybani’s vision, one that is only taken when and 
where the enemy has refused to submit to Islam’s call and it is military 
advantageous to launch an attack.17 Pursuant to this, Shaybani lays out 
elaborate rules for the jihad, both in terms of the manner in which it is to be 
initiated—what would in the modern discourse of international law be 
described as jus ad bellum—as well as the manner it was to be conducted 
once it had been initiated, referred to in modern international law as jus in 
bello.18 These details have been recounted at length by various academic 
commentators and hardly require comprehensive elaboration here.19
However, some observations may be made concerning Shaybani’s work 
that in many ways help to contextualize his conception of international 
relations in Islam. 
The first is that Shaybani lived during the Abbasid caliphate.20 Up to 
that time, Islam as a polity had only known expansion.21 It seemed too 
obvious to Muslims at the time, and indeed to many of their enemies, that it 
was the “manifest destiny” of the House of Islam, and indeed the fulfillment 
of the Will of God, that the House of Islam would continue to so expand 
until it spanned the globe.22 Accordingly, Shaybani’s focus is on the manner 
in which Muslim armies conduct themselves in attacks on enemy territory.23
The “defensive jihad” that consumes the attention of later classical jurists,24
and indeed nearly all contemporary jihadist movements,25 is simply not 
15 See KHADDURI, supra note 11 at 11. Shaybani himself uses this distinction extensively in his 
work. See, e.g., KHADDURI, supra note 11 at 130–33 (discussing trade between House of War and 
House of Islam).  
16 See id. at 12. 
17 JOHN KELSAY, ARGUING THE JUST WAR IN ISLAM 100–01 (2007); KHADDURI, supra note 11 
at 95. 
18 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 95–102; KELSAY, supra note 17, at 100–10. 
19 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 95–102; KELSAY, supra note 17, at 100–10.
20 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 28. 
21 See AMIRA K. BENNISON, GREAT CALIPHS: THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE ‘ABBASID EMPIRE 4–5 
(2009).
22 Id. at 4. 
23 See KELSAY, supra note 17, at 114. 
24 See notes 35–42 infra and accompanying text.
25 Hamoudi, supra note 6, at 428–29. 
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important to Shaybani in his context. 
Perhaps for this reason, Shaybani, and indeed nearly all early classical 
jurists, envision the duty of jihad as being a communal duty rather than an 
individual one.26 Indeed, as late as the early twelfth century C.E., the noted 
Maliki scholar Ibn Rushd could write in his own work on jihad that
“scholars agree that the jihad is a collective and not a personal obligation,” 
noting as exception only the circumstance where nobody else is available to 
take part in it.27 This means that while it is the obligation of the community 
as a whole to conduct it, not every single individual needs to be involved in 
it.28 Some cannot take part even if they would like to. Permission from 
parents, for example, is required, and at least according to some accounts, 
permission from creditors.29
Moreover, and equally importantly, Shaybani envisioned it to be 
exclusively the role of the leader of the Muslim community to organize, 
direct and manage the fighting.30 The caliph would determine how many 
fighters might be needed, where they might be deployed, when fighting 
would be initiated, and how it might be ended. Given this, loyalty to obey 
army commands was an important prerequisite for participation in the 
jihad.31
Thus, Shaybani’s jihad was certainly a central feature of the House of 
Islam, but it could hardly be described as all-consuming. It was an 
obligation of the Muslim community as a whole to undertake as a means to 
expand the House of Islam until it encompassed the globe. However, it was 
not one that would necessarily affect the lives of each individual. A 
significant number of able-bodied Muslims could very well never in their 
lives take up arms, and this would not in any way detract from the 
fulfillment of the communal obligation, so long as the caliph’s calls for 
fighters to partake in a jihad, when made, were fulfilled by sufficient 
numbers within the community. Indeed, the very fact that at times the 
married would not participate,32 that prospective fighters needed their 
parents’ permission,33 and that debtors without means to pay their debts 
26 See, e.g., KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 85 (noting that married men were not called for the 
jihad in the time of the Second Caliph, but asked to supply horses for it); see also MAJID KHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 60–61 (1955). 
27 ABU AL-WALID MUHAMMAD IBN MUHAMMAD IBN RUSHD, The Chapter on Jihad From 
Averroes’ Legal Handbook “Bidayat Al-Mudjtahid”, in JIHAD IN MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN ISLAM 9–
10 (Rudolph Peters trans., E.J. Brill, Leiden 5th vol. 1977). 
28 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 61; IBN RUSHD, supra note 27, at 9. 
29 See IBN RUSHD, supra note 27, at 9; KHADDURI, supra note 26, at 85–86. 
30 See KELSAY, supra note 17, at 101; KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 61. 
31 See KHADDURI, supra note 26, at 86. 
32 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 85. 
33 See IBN RUSHD, supra note 27, at 9; see also KHADDURI, supra note 26, at 85–86.
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were not supposed to participate either,34 suggests that the community 
recognized values of a commercial and familial nature alongside the jihad.
B.  The Rise of Defensive Jihad
Long before the end of the classical era, Shaybani’s assumptions 
respecting Islam’s inevitable expansion began to appear increasingly less 
plausible. In particular, the Crusades in the Muslim West and the Mongol 
invasions from the East caused at least some jurists to think more deeply 
about the concept of defensive jihad.35 It might very well make sense to 
leave the coordination of an expansionist campaign to the discretion of a 
political leader, and to limit those who are participating in it so as to realize 
other societal values. However the same was almost surely not true in the 
case of non-Muslim forces invading Muslim lands. In such instances, there 
seemed to be greater urgency to respond to the threat than Shaybani’s rules 
anticipated.
Much of this reached its apotheosis with a prominent early fourteenth 
century Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, who has proved to be something of 
an inspiration to contemporary jihadist movements.36 Part of the reason for 
this arises out of his seeming obsession with directing violence at Muslims 
who were insufficiently pure, with his particular contemporaneous example 
being the Mongols.37 It is not difficult to see why Ibn Taymiyya’s strident 
railing against the Mongols for their alleged impurities respecting the faith 
could prove as inspiration to any number of jihadist groups in the Muslim 
world attacking states, institutions and people who are overwhelmingly 
Muslim.38
More importantly for the purposes of this paper, Ibn Taymiyya also 
played a critical role in developing the idea, soundly rejected by earlier 
scholars from Shaybani through to Ibn Rushd, that jihad could in certain 
circumstances be an individual duty. Specifically, Ibn Taymiyya indicated, 
when Muslims are attacked, the individual obligation is triggered, not only 
by those directly affected by the attack, but rather by each individual 
34 See IBN RUSHD, supra note 27, at 9; KHADDURI, supra note 26, at 85–86. 
35 See, e.g., KELSAY, supra note 17, at 115–22. 
36 See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 45 (2002).
37 See id. at 46.
38 One of the starkest examples of this stridency of extremist Islamists against fellow Muslims 
lies in the case of Al Qaeda. While it may be best known in the West as the perpetrator of the 9/11 
attacks in New York and Washington, the 7/7 attacks on the London subway, and the Madrid train 
bombings, the fact is that between 2006 and 2008, non-Westerners in overwhelmingly Muslim states 
were 38 times more likely to be killed by Al Qaeda than Westerners. See Yassin Musharbash, Surprising
Study on Terrorism: Al-Qaida Kills Eight Times More Muslims Than Non-Muslims, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 3, 2009), www.spiegel.de/international/world/surprising-study-on-terrorism-al-
qaida-kills-eight-times-more-muslims-than-non-muslims-a-660619.html.
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Muslim, whether or not a professional soldier.39
While this will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, it might be noted 
that there is still considerable distance between this vision and that of the 
lone wolf terrorist attack. The principle of individual duty, being expounded 
in the context of Mongol invasion and Crusade alike, does not seem to 
implicate atomized and disorganized violence, because it is difficult to see 
how that would in fact drive out either invading force. Rather, the matter 
seemed to derive as response to the urgency of supplying necessary 
numbers of fighters to an organized army to repel an attack. Hence, Ibn 
Taymiyya relies upon the fabled Islamic example of the Battle of the 
Trench, where each individual in the entire community was obligated by the 
Prophet Muhammad to participate in the defense of Medina from an enemy 
siege, but was under no obligation to pursue the enemy once the siege was 
broken.40 At that point, the fighting became voluntary again, and 
presumably only those with sufficient knowledge of warfare would 
continue to participate.41
In fact, one might find some congruity between Ibn Taymiyya’s notion 
of the individual duty of jihad and Ibn Rushd’s insistence on the jihad as a 
collective one. After all, even Ibn Rushd indicated that if there was nobody 
left to carry out the jihad, then an individual had to participate.42 Ibn Rushd 
may have imagined a circumstance where an attack was called, and yet 
there were insufficient numbers of fighters in a given area to carry it out. 
However, his exception to the principle of collective duty, limited as he 
might have imagined it, could easily be extended to circumstances, like the 
Mongol sack of Baghdad, where as many fighters as possible were needed 
to protect territories within the House of Islam that were under direct threat. 
C.  Recognition of Non-Muslim Polities 
The previous section seems to describe a Muslim community that grew 
continuously more suspicious of non-Muslim polities over the course of 
centuries and developed doctrines to reflect that hostility. This, however, is 
incorrect, for even as the ideas of individual jihad were being refined, so 
too were there broad trends in favor of increasing recognition of non-
Muslim states that might not be in some sort of permanent state of war with 
Islam. The primary means to expand these principles had their origins in 
Shaybani’s work. They are, first, the possibility of treaties with non-Muslim 
states, and second, the principle of a covenant of safe passage, or aman, on 
the part of a non-Muslim in the House of Islam, and vice versa. 
39 See KELSAY, supra note 17, at 117. 
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See IBN RUSHD, supra note 27, at 9. 
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As Shaybani envisioned these concepts, they were circumscribed, and 
in a manner that would make it nearly impossible to presume any sort of 
permanent peace or amicable relations between the House of Islam and the 
House of War. Shaybani classifies treaties into different types. First, there 
were the treaties that were imposed upon those monotheistic communities 
known as “People of the Book.”43 According to Shaybani, this sort of treaty 
effectively involved the requirement of that community to pay a tax and 
then to live under the protection of the House of Islam.44 A treaty with 
communities in the unsubjugated House of War was also possible, but only 
so long as the leader of the Muslim community “has considered the 
situation and has found that the inhabitants of the territory of war are too 
strong for the Muslims to prevail against them and it would be better for the 
Muslims to make peace with them.”45 Early classical jurists generally 
limited the time period for such treaties to no more than ten years.46 One 
imagines an arrangement of this sort to resemble a cease fire in modernity 
more than any sort of permanent recognition of the non-Muslim state. 
The other concept discussed by Shaybani and developed by later 
jurists was known as the aman. Those individuals from the House of War 
who have been granted an aman, known as the mustaminun, were free to 
enter the House of Islam and reside and travel freely within it until so long 
as the covenant lasted.47 Similarly, Muslims granted an aman by the House 
of War were free to travel within it as well.48 In either case, there was a 
strict obligation on the part of the musta’min to neither engage in any sort 
of fraud, cheating, or dishonesty, nor to violate any of the terms of the 
aman.49 Early classical jurists tended to limit the duration of the aman to a 
year.50 In other words, the residence of a Muslim in non-Muslim lands was 
generally viewed as temporary. One prominent jurist of the Hanafi school 
went so far as to insist that a person should not even have marital sex in the 
House of War because this might lead to the conception of a child, which 
could lead the believer to want to settle there, a presumed serious sin.51
43 KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 142.
44 See id.
45 Id. at 154. 
46 See Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law, 
2005 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 1, 14 (2005). 
47 See KHADDURI, supra note 11, at 158–62; see also Majid Khadduri, War and Peace IN THE 
LAW OF ISLAM 164–65 (1955). 
48 See ANDREW MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING
CONSENSUS 186 (2009). 
49 See id. at 186. As March indicates, contemporary jurists use these principles to obligate 
Muslims living in non-Muslim states to obey all relevant laws. 
50 See KHADDURI, supra note 26, at 168. 
51 See MARCH, supra note 48, at 106. 
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It does not take a great deal of imagination to expand these concepts 
into ones that involve more robust recognition of non-Muslim states, and 
non-Muslim inhabitants of those states. In particular, the notion of treaties 
lasting no more than ten years came under increasingly significant pressure 
in light of the fact that there was no explicit Prophetic prohibition against 
longer term treaties.52 The reasoning in favor of a ten year limit, that the 
Prophet Muhammad had not concluded a longer term treaty, might have 
appeared sensible to early jurists who had every reason to believe that 
ultimately the entire world would be subsumed within the House of Islam.53
It started to appear a rather flimsy basis not to permit longer treaties in 
subsequent eras, when it was obvious that conquest of the entire non-
Muslim world was not possible, and relationships of a more lasting nature 
needed to be established.54 From this, it is rather easy to add a third part of 
the world in addition to the House of War and the House of Islam—that of 
the House of Reconciliation, or the Dar al-Sulh, to use the Arabic. This 
referred to that part of the world that did not accept the authority of the 
House of Islam, and yet was not in any sort of war with it.55 Rather, 
relations were amicable.56
Similarly, the concept of the aman can readily be developed in a 
fashion that permits considerable interaction and coexistence as between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, for example, what began as a plainly 
recognized, but temporary, right to travel to the House of War to trade and 
engage in other similar activities developed into a more robust juristic 
recognition of permanent residence in non-Muslim states.57 Similarly, but in 
reverse, as early as the sixteenth century the Ottoman empire widely 
granted revocable “ahdnames” pursuant to which European merchants 
enjoyed covenants of security.58 The seeds of a new, more interdependent 
world were already sown by that time. 
52 See Ali & Rahman, supra note 46, at 14. 
53 See id.
54 See id. at 14–15.
55 See M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., A Survey of Islamic International Law, 76. AM. SOC. INT. L.
PROC. 56, 57 (1982). 
56 See id.
57 See MARCH, supra note 48, at 184–86. 
58 Feroz Ahmad, Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations 1800–1914, 11 J. Isl. Stud. 1, 2 
(2000); Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition 
and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 552 (2010). Later, as the Ottomans grew weaker and 
Europe stronger, these started to take on the form of capitulations that bred no small amount of 
resentment. See Ahmad, supra at 1–3. The point for these purposes, however, is that the precedent in 
favor of the idea of a Muslim ruler granting protection, and even rights of residence, to non-Muslims 
from non-Muslim states pursuant to the concept of the aman had already been established well before 
such capitulations were imposed on a reluctant Ottoman empire. 
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Thus, to summarize, it is true that the most influential early Muslim 
jurists, and in particular the highly influential Ibn Hasan al-Shaybani, 
envisioned a bipolar world, and considered war a primary, but not exclusive 
or even preferred, means by which to expand Islam until it conquered the 
globe. At the same time, it is fair to say that changes over the course of 
centuries throughout the vast and varied Islamic world caused considerable 
reevaluation of some of Shaybani’s core hypotheses. The major change I 
have examined is the realization on the part of the House of Islam that it 
could lose wars just as much as it could win them, and that therefore it was 
surely not the case that the House of Islam was likely to encompass the 
globe by virtue of military conquest within any reasonably foreseeable time 
period. Indeed, at times, war might arise not so much because of a desire to 
expand the House of Islam, but to defend it from collapse or at least a 
significant military defeat. This led to two primary developments from the 
standpoint of Islamic international relations in the classical period. The first 
of these was to strengthen the concept of jihad so as to include within it the 
idea of an individual duty on the part of each and every Muslim to fight 
when the House of Islam was under attack. The second was the recognition 
that there needed to be some means to get along with that substantial part of 
the globe, and the people residing in it, in a manner that was not premised 
on the existence of permanent hostility. 
The next section will show how these concepts have been developed 
by contemporary jurists generally to justify current geopolitical realities, 
and Part IV will show how that acceptance has been challenged by rising 
jihadist groups. Yet, equally importantly, that final Part will also show how 
the jihadist challenge is in the end no more “literal” in its application of 
classical norms than the broadly accepted modernist approach. It merely 
privileges different parts of the tradition. 
III. MODERN MUSLIM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
From the previous section, it is easy to discern the manner by which 
the normalization of relations between Muslim states and non-Muslim 
states is justified. The United Nations Charter, after all, is a treaty.
Admittedly, it lasts longer than ten years, but as we have seen, the position 
that a treaty last no more than a decade had already largely eroded centuries 
before the establishment of the United Nations following the Second World 
War.59 Similarly, the permanent presence of Muslims into non-Muslim 
territories and the reverse is in many ways an extension of the aman, which 
long permitted Muslims to travel to non-Muslim lands, and the reverse, so 
59 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (describing rejection by later classical jurists of 
ten-year limitation).  
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long as they did so pursuant to a covenant granted by the territory in 
question.60 If the covenant might be imagined as a travel visa or even a right 
of permanent residency, and adherence to the laws of the non-Muslim state 
the conditions pursuant to which that covenant is issued, then obedience to 
law on the part of Muslims in non-Muslim states, and indeed loyalty to 
those states, enjoys considerable justification from classical era authority.61
Indeed, the evolution has in many ways proceeded so naturally and so 
comfortably that even many groups deploying violence in the name of jihad
largely adopt its normative presumptions. As I have written elsewhere, 
Islamist militant organizations from Hamas to Hezbollah appear to derive 
their justifications for violence almost as readily from principles of radical 
anti-colonialism as they do from shari’a.62 Hence they make repeated 
references to “resistance” to foreign occupation as being their raison d’etre, 
a concept so deeply ingrained that the Arabic term for resistance appears in 
the website of Hezbollah, and is part of the acronym of the name “Hamas”
which, fully translated, is “The Movement of the Islamic Resistance.”63
That these notions of anti-colonialism and resistance to occupation are 
broadly popular in the Muslim world is well demonstrated by the fact that 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly known as the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference), an organization comprising nearly 
all of the Muslim majority nations in the world, issued a declaration in 
Kuala Lumpur specifically exempting from any definition of terrorism 
“resistance to foreign aggression and the struggle of peoples under colonial 
or alien domination and foreign occupation for national liberation and self-
determination.”64 Plainly, the idea that a people have the right to resist 
occupation when their lands are taken by colonialists and other foreign 
aggressors was not one that was remotely recognizable in Shaybani’s time. 
The very point of the jihad, after all, was to bring other lands and other 
peoples within the House of Islam, and thereby subject them to Islamic 
domination.65 This principle of self-determination instead owes its origins 
to very modern ideas espoused in the United Nations Charter.66
60 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the concept of the 
aman over the course of the classical era). 
61 This is, to be clear, a significant reduction of the intricate legal and ethical questions that 
would surround the extent of Muslim loyalty to a non-Muslim state under the classical conception of the 
aman. For a richer account, one which would necessarily lie beyond the scope of this paper. See
MARCH, supra note 49, at 183–96. 
62 See Hamoudi (Muezzin), supra note 6 at 428. 
63 Id. at 464. 
64 Id. at 465; see also Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on 
International Terrorism, art. 8 (Apr. 3, 2002), www.oic-oci.org/englishlconflfm/l1_extraordinary/
declaration.htm.
65 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
66 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (respecting territorial integrity and noninterference).  
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At the same time, there is some unmistakable tension with classical 
norms and understandings that arise in these approaches, as reputable 
commentators have indicated.67 The evolutionary broadening of the scope 
and duration of treaties and covenants may be natural, but when the end 
result is the establishment of an ethos of mutual recognition and respect, it 
obviously is somewhat discordant with past positions in a manner that can 
be difficult to justify. It is one thing, after all, to suggest that a temporary 
truce with a non-Muslim state can last more than ten years, and that its 
terms must be respected because of an obligation on the part of Muslims to 
adhere to their contracts. It is quite another to establish on the basis of this a 
principle that it is ethically forbidden to attack any non-Muslim state at any 
time if the end is to bring it within the House of Islam. Similarly, it is one 
thing to suggest that Muslims can stay for lengthy periods of time in a non-
Muslim state under a covenant of security. It is quite another to suggest that 
this covenant can then establish bonds of loyalty to a non-Muslim state, to 
the extent that it obligates the Muslim to take up arms on behalf of the state 
against a Muslim polity.68
Modernist justifications take two different forms. The first, dominant 
approach is to more or less ignore the problematic classical material and 
argue directly from Qur’anic text.69 This hermeneutical approach proves to 
be quite convenient because there is no shortage of Qur’anic verse that 
seems to support principles of mutual tolerance and nonaggression toward 
non-Muslims and non-Muslim polities.70 Indeed, the chapter of the Qur’an 
that is entitled “The Disbelievers” ends with God instructing the Prophet to 
tell those who do not believe in his Apostlehood, “for you is your religion, 
and for me is my religion.”71
The problem is, as the first section of this paper makes clear, it is 
perfectly obvious that the jurists of Shaybani’s time, and those who lived 
for centuries afterwards, throughout the classical era, did not regard these 
verses as propounding the type of ethical tolerance that modernists claim. 
Ignoring that classical authority may in some ways free the modernist 
scholar, but it hardly avoids the tension. Certainly, it provides no answer at 
all to any jihadist group, which points to such authorities as representing an 
authentic tradition spanning centuries that the modernist is neglecting. 
67 See, e.g., MARCH, supra note 48, at 184–86, 199.
68 March maintains that it is nearly impossible to justify on the basis of classical doctrine a duty 
of national loyalty to a non-Muslim state that would involve taking up arms against an Islamic state. See
id. at 114–15. As I have indicated elsewhere, however, traditionalist scholars in the contemporary era 
have identified precisely such a duty in various circumstances. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Book Review: 
Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 26 J. L. & REL. 387, 395–96 (2010). 
69 See MARCH, supra note 48, at 197–99. 
70 See id. at 197 (offering a sampling of such material). 
71 Qur’an 109:6 (Sahih International Translation). 
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Thus, in the end, ignoring the classical doctrine has had its benefits—if 
nothing else, it demonstrates that Islam’s sacred texts can be read in a wide 
variety of different ways, and that the classical readings are the product of 
political, social, and economic contingency rather than antiseptic and 
necessitarian deductive reasoning. However, ignoring the classical tradition 
also has its limits, in particular in responding to the challenge that 
recognizing non-Muslim states and their right to exist is at stark odds with 
the positions held by authoritative jurists for over a millennium. 
That said, there have been efforts to somehow reconcile a classical past 
with current conceptions of international law. Speaking broadly, and some 
might say reductively, these varied approaches all tend to emphasize that 
the classical Manichean division was a response of sorts to prevailing 
political conditions. In a world where there was no such thing as a principle 
of mutual recognition in international relations, and the normal state of 
affairs was a perduring “state of war,” the only choices were extermination 
or conquest.72 To quote one of the most rigorous works along these lines: 
Muslim juristic writings . . . reflect[ed] the principle that only Muslims 
would permit Muslims to remain Muslims. They continued to see jihad
not only as a means of guaranteeing the security and freedom of the 
Muslims, by as virtually the only means of doing so. For even peace-
treaties were usually the result of one’s surrender to demands that had 
been imposed by a real or anticipated defeat by the sword.73
The approach is plausible enough, though the criticism of it as 
“optimistic” certainly has some purchase.74 The real problem, however, is 
that a jihadist approach appears more direct and literal than such 
contextualization can ever hope to. That is, a terrorist organization claiming 
to recreate an ideal Islamic State and promising to expand it until it 
encompasses the earth sounds like precisely what Shaybani was seeking. It 
is of course entirely reasonable to place Shaybani’s words in a particular 
context, to suggest that Shaybani’s proscriptions related exclusively to that 
72 Sherman Jackson, Jihad and the Modern World, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 14–17 (2002). 
73 Id. at 17. As Ali and Rehman have indicated, other approaches seeking to reconcile the juristic 
tradition with modern norms of mutual recognition and tolerance similarly emphasize that the “age of 
expansion” within juristic thought, which subdivided the world into a House of Islam and a House of 
War, “was necessitated by prevailing conditions and a sense of insecurity among the fledgling Muslim 
community.” Id. at 14.
74 MARCH, supra note 48, at 201. As we have seen, Shaybani insists that there is an obligation to 
subject non-Muslims to jihad in particular when they are weak, refraining from doing so only when the 
Muslims are not able to defeat them. This seems more like an ethical obligation to subjugate any polity 
that can be subjugated than it is the expression of a fear that in the future, somehow that polity will 
become so powerful as to pose a threat to the House of Islam. If the fear were the eventual subjugation 
of the Muslims, one would have expected a more extended treatment by jurists in Shaybani’s era of 
defensive jihad. Yet, as we have seen, there was none, precisely because losing wars continuously did 
not seem to lie within their imagination.
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context, and to try to draw different principles for a different world. That 
entirely reasonable approach may indeed prove compelling to large parts of 
the Muslim world already content with the normative principles espoused in 
the United Nations Charter, including very much violent groups who claim 
to be engaged in some sort of resistance to occupation, as earlier discussed. 
However, the argument may fairly run, for those malcontents who seek to 
challenge existing geopolitical norms, and use violence to do it, centuries of 
juristic texts exhorting eternal violence against the House of War lie 
conveniently waiting. This, it might be argued, is precisely why a group of 
psychopaths calling themselves the Islamic State roaming the currently 
defunct national border between Iraq and Syria have proven so 
spectacularly successful at raising recruits from across the world, as Al 
Qaeda was before it.75
IV. JIHADISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE LONE WOLF
Thus, jihadism might very well be deemed to be “direct” or “literal” as 
concerns some parts of the tradition. However, there are other parts where it 
decidedly is not. That is to say, in its idea of the resumption of the 
caliphate, its Manichean division of the world into a House of War and a 
House of Islam, and its pronouncement of what appears to be a ceaseless 
war against unbelief, it sounds in the first instance to be that which 
Shaybani and his contemporaries were calling for. However, jihadists
depart from the classical models in other ways, and in no less significant a 
fashion than any modernist does. There are many examples that could be 
raised.76 However, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on one—a method 
of terrorism that knows no classical counterpart and yet one on which 
international jihadist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS rely heavily. This is so-
called “lone wolf” terrorism. 
75 Both ISIS and Al Qaeda have proven quite appealing to certain segments of Muslims 
internationally. While estimates vary, the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq almost certainly 
lies in the tens of thousands. The vast majority are from the Middle East and North Africa, but the 
number also includes several dozen from the United States, several hundred from the United Kingdom, 
and perhaps as many as one thousand from France. See Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS and the 
Foreign Fighter Phenomenon, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2015), www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2015/03/isis-and-the-foreign-fighter-problem/387166. While of course this represents only a 
small fraction of the number of Muslims in those countries, let alone the number of Muslims in the 
world, the broader point remains that these organizations are able to recruit quite well internationally.  
76 Beyond lone wolf terrorism, the subject of this paper, the most obvious problem with 
extremist groups is that so much of their aggression is directed against Muslim polities. See note 39 
supra and accompanying text. The territory that ISIS is contesting lies entirely within nations, such as 
Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, that are Muslim. Early classical jurists certainly never imagined a caliphate 
formed out of the thin air that directed its efforts against existing Muslim loci of power, and efforts to 
define such efforts as a form of legitimate rebellion are contentious at best. See Kelsay, supra note 17, at 
194-95.
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The appeal of lone wolf terrorism to a jihadist group is relatively easy 
to understand. Strong and effective states such as the United States can 
initiate air strikes against terrorist organizations, and their law enforcement 
agencies can penetrate and break up terrorist cells. These techniques are 
much less effective, however, against “lone wolves,” who by definition 
carry out their operations without consultation with or planning by a higher 
central organization.77 Hence major law enforcement figures from FBI 
director Robert Mueller to CIA director Leon Panetta to Homeland Security 
Secretary Janet Napolitano have expressed serious concern about the threat 
of lone wolf terrorism.78 President Obama in fact described lone wolves as 
“a risk” over which he was “especially concerned” because of the damage 
that such individuals could exact and the difficulty of detecting them.79
Noticing the advantages it provides, groups like Al Qaeda have 
extolled lone wolf terrorism for years, with Bin Laden going so far as to 
describe the aims of the organization as follows: “Al Qaeda wants to keep 
jihad alive and active and make it part of the daily life of the Muslims. It
wants to give it the status of worship.”80
Muslims pray five times a day, and by necessity, given their 
frequency, the vast majority of those prayers for most people are done 
privately, without consultation or coordination with any broader 
organization. Given this, what Bin Laden seems to have in mind is over a 
billion individuals considering on a daily basis and perhaps several times a 
day different ways in which violence might be perpetrated against an infidel 
enemy. One can only imagine the kind of havoc that could be unleashed if 
this call were heeded by large numbers of Muslims. 
While the matter of lone wolf terrorism is less pronounced in the case 
of ISIS, which of course is seeking to draw recruits to travel to its 
“caliphate” and fight there in a more organized fashion,81 it is by no means 
averse to using lone wolves to advance political aims. Hence, for example, 
it called for a “month of disaster” during Ramadan of 2015, urging Muslims 
everywhere to redouble their efforts towards jihad, leading to a series of 
attacks throughout the Muslim world, including a single suicide bomber 
77 See Fred Burton & Scott Stewart, The ‘Lone Wolf’ Disconnect, SECURITY WEEKLY (Jan. 30, 
2008), www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect (“The theory is that this distance [from a 
terrorist organization] will prevent disclosure of attack planning to informants or technical surveillance 
and therefore provide superior operational security.”). Burton and Stewart define a “lone wolf” terrorist 
as “a person who acts on his or her own without orders from—or even connections to—an 
organization.” See also RAMON SPAAIJ, UNDERSTANDING LONE WOLF TERRORISM: GLOBAL PATTERNS,
MOTIVATIONS AND PREVENTION 16 (2012) (describing this definition as “the most frequently cited”). 
78 See Spaaij, supra note 77, at 2–3. 
79 Id. at 2. 
80 FAISAL DEVJI, LANDSCAPES OF THE JIHAD: MILITANCY, MORALITY, MODERNITY (2005). 
81 Stern & Berger, supra note 75. 
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killing dozens at a Shi’i mosque in Kuwait, and a lone wolf attack on a gas 
factory in Lyon, France, accompanied by a beheading of a local 
businessman.82
The end result of all of this is the legitimation of a position that creates 
just as much tension with classical thought as the mainstream approach of 
normalizing modern international law does. If classical Islamic law is 
dominated by the idea of subjugating a House of War, it is also dominated 
by the idea of an ordered method to do it. The jihad is conducted under the 
auspices of the caliph, by the number of soldiers required by the caliph, 
with attacks and truces determined ultimately by the caliph, and using 
soldiers who obey army commands strictly. Everyone else in the social 
order is not expected to participate, as the duty is communal, meaning that 
for many individuals, not only is the jihad not part of their daily lives, as 
Bin Laden would like it to be, but it is not a meaningful part of their lives at 
all.
And if it is the case that the jihad becomes in the later classical period 
an individual duty, that merely refers to the obligation of each individual to 
join the Muslim armies, temporarily, until the enemy is repelled. It does not 
in the classical era ever seem to refer to random individualized and 
atomized violence. Nor was individual jihad ever deemed to be permanent. 
Even Ibn Taymiyya, as vigorous a defender of the notion of individual jihad
as might be found, refers to the obligation of everyone to fight when the 
Muslims are attacked, even those who are not professional soldiers. The
presumption is necessarily a war of limited duration. Otherwise, every 
person is by definition a professional soldier. 
Finally, when jihadist violence is conducted by a Muslim resident in a 
non-Muslim state, that position requires one not only to abandon the idea of 
the organized jihad, but it also all but destroys any conception of the 
covenant of security. It is one thing to urge Muslims to leave a non-Muslim 
land where they enjoy a covenant to rejoin the House of War to conduct a 
jihad. It is quite another to tell them to perpetrate acts of violence in the 
place where they have been granted a covenant, as that is as obvious a 
breach of the covenant as might be imagined. There is very little in classical 
Islamic law that would seem to justify this, and yet, without undertaking a 
covenant, probably in a duplicitous fashion, and then breaking it, it is hard 
to imagine how the lone wolf terrorist could ever be successful. 
In sum, classical jihad was largely communal, where lone wolf 
terrorism urges the cessation of any communication with an organized force 
at all. Classical jihad was focused on preserving the authority of the caliph, 
82 Sam Jones & Erica Solomon, ISIS Preoccupied by Holy Writ, but Nothing is Sacred, FIN.
TIMES (June 26, 2015, 8:21 PM), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c7f8cc98-1c1d-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.
html#axzz3r3ZsFSoe.
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and lone wolf terrorism is about disassociated violence. Classical jihad
sought to render war one of many objectives of the good state, and lone 
wolf terrorism is in furtherance of an ideal wherein everyone thinks about 
how to conduct violence, all of the time. And classical jihad takes 
covenants seriously,83 where lone wolf terrorism relies upon the breaking of 
a covenant through deception to succeed. 
To the extent that any of this can be justified, at all, one of two 
approaches might be taken. The first would be to attempt to locate within 
sacred text some sort of justificatory material, irrespective of what the 
classical tradition might have to say. Bin Laden certainly seems to adopt 
this approach at times, showing near contempt for the intricacies of classical 
law.84 The similarity to modernists turning to Qur’anic verse to justify 
modern international relations while ignoring the corpus of Islamic law on 
classical jihad is striking. 
The other, even more interesting, approach would be to undertake an 
exercise in contextualization. The argument would run that Shaybani and 
his contemporaries never considered defensive jihad in any detail because 
they never thought they would lose many wars. Later jurists writing at the 
time of the Crusades and subsequently the Mongol invasions were acutely 
aware of the problem and sought to address it by rendering jihad an
individual duty so long as Muslim lands were under attack.85 However, 
even they lived in different circumstances, for once the threat subsided, then 
the normal state of affairs could resume, where jihad was an obligation of 
the community, and not every individual in it. 
Yet in the current circumstances, the jihadist argument runs, Muslim 
states are so weak as to be in a state of pervasive and near entire 
occupation by non-Muslim powers and their apostate puppets—that, in 
effect, the colonial powers are deepening the incursion into Muslim lands 
that was begun at the time of the Crusades.86 Thus, defensive, individual 
jihad is not temporary under such a hypothetical approach, but perpetual, at 
least for so long as this occupation continues.87 Moreover, given the 
weakness of the Muslim states, which can barely organize the resources 
necessary to sustain the House of Islam, the jihad no longer need be 
conducted under the auspices of any religious or political leader at all, but 
in fact it is as individually organized as it is individually obligated.88
83 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
84 See Devji, supra note 80. 
85 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
86 Hamas appears to take this view. See KELSAY, supra note 17, at 133–34.
87 See id. at 135–36. 
88 See id. at 138–39 (describing Bin Laden). 
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There may be dispute over whether that type of contextualization is 
plausible, but I will only note that in the form of argument, it resembles 
very much the positions of modernists in defending modern international 
relations with non-Muslim states, and it is vulnerable to the very same 
attacks and criticisms. It is hardly the direct or literal application of any 
classical rules, and in fact in many cases seems facially at odds with many 
of them. It merely is justifying different rules based on alternative contexts 
uncontemplated by classical forebears. Whatever that is, it is not literalism, 
and jihadists are therefore not textualists. They merely insist on strict 
application of texts that suit them, and contextualize everything else. 
Which, in the end, is precisely what liberals, reformists, and modernists do 
as well.89
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to expose a fallacy respecting the 
justification of using the classical Islamic concept of jihad to perpetrate 
violence against non-Muslim polities in modernity. This fallacy is that there 
is a broad classical condoning of such practices, and that as a result, the 
jihadist is at something of an advantage in justifying violence, as the 
jihadist merely needs to figuratively wave authoritative texts in the face of 
any modernist and demand their “direct” and “literal” application. The 
problem is that even if a modernist position justifying the recognition of 
non-Muslim states on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance is not one 
found in classical texts, it is similarly not the case that many of the types of 
violence that predominate in modern jihadism, and in particular lone wolf 
terrorism, can be found in any sort of “direct” or “literal” fashion in 
classical texts either. In the end, reformists and modernists are more likely 
to insist on a more direct reading of sacred text as concerns conduct in war, 
while seeking contextualization on when war should take place. By 
contrast, jihadists necessarily need to contextualize conduct in war, and 
insist on the direct application of the principle of eternal war against and the 
ultimate subjugation of the unbelievers who populate the House of War. 
Neither approach is more “literal” or “strict.” Both are manipulating 
doctrine to respond to preexisting political and ideological commitments, as 
legal actors always do. 
89 See supra notes 74–75. 
